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COMMENTS
POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF NON-MANUFACTURER
CERTIFIERS OF QUALITY
As our society progresses and methods of production and distribution
expand to proportions once considered impossible, the law must be
adapted to deal adequately with new situations. Probably the most
significant example of such judicial flexibility in keeping abreast of
economic development is provided by the recent evolution of products
liability as an almost generic concept. To market the superabundant
products and services of the American economy, many innovations appear
in mass-media advertising.
One significant development in the advertising world is the growth
of independent testing agencies who convey information to the public
about available products and services. The purpose of this comment
is to examine the various theories which might be employed to impose
liability, both in favor of consumers and competitors, upon non-manufacturer certifiers of quality. Primary attention will be directed toward
the tort of negligent misrepresentation since that appears best designed
to cope with the potential harms in this area. Remedies in warranty and
under relevant legislation will be discussed briefly in the hope that
such analysis will further particularize the problem at hand.'
I.
TRADITIONAL

NOTIONS

It has been suggested that, "one area of potential liability which
remains open is the possible liability of testing laboratories and other
agencies certifying 'quality'."'2 Until recently such a proposition would
have been severely criticized as a completely untenable legal theory.
Today, however, with the expansion of liability in the areas of negligent
misrepresentation and warranty, especially with regard to manufacturers'
liability to ultimate consumers it cannot be disregarded. Traditionally
in such actions, if no privity existed between the parties, no liability
8
could be imposed.
1.See generally, Note, Liability Of A Testing Company To Third Parties, 1964
U.L.Q. 77.
2. 1 FRUMER & FRIDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABLITY 7 (1964).
3. There have been exceptions in specific types of cases:
1) Abstracter cases - although the majority rule requires privity as enunciated in the leading case, Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1880), some cases have
resulted in liability absent privity, where the abstracter has knowledge that the third
party would rely on the abstract; e.g., Brown v. Sims, 22 Ind. App. 317, 53 N.E. 779
(1899). Also, liability to third parties has been imposed under statutes in a number
of jurisdictions. See Annot., 34 A.L.R. 67, 73-74.
2) Notary Public cases - generally public officers, such as notary publics,
are liable for damage proximately caused to those relying on a certificate that the
WASH.

(708)
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The privity doctrine found its inception in the landmark case of
Winterbottom v. Wright4 where the defendant had contracted to keep
certain coaches in safe condition. A coachman, who was injured when
the defendant negligently permitted the coaches to fall into disrepair,
was denied recovery on the basis of lack of privity. The court saw
defendant's duty as contractual in nature and the plaintiff being a third
party was not entitled to assert the contract obligation.
II.
BODILY AND PROPERTY

DAMAGE VERSUS

FINANCIAL LOSS

At the outset, a distinction must be made between physical harm
on the one hand and commercial or financial loss on thd other. The former
was actionable long before the latter. An example is the case of Van
Winkle v. American Steam-Boiler Ins. Co.,5 in which an insurance company inspected certain boilers and furnished certificates as to the maximum
load maintainable by the safety valve. Plaintiff, a third party, and not
a third party beneficiary, recovered for injuries sustained as a result of
the negligent inspection. 6
Cases such as Van Winkle do, however, stress the danger inherent
in the objects if improperly inspected, with such language as:
... that in all cases in which any person undertakes the performance
of an act, which, if not done with care and skill, will be highly
dangerous to the persons or lives of one or more persons, known
or unknown, the law, ipso facto, imposes,
as a public duty, the
7
obligation to exercise such care and skill.
That courts are less reluctant to impose liability where physical injury
occurs is understandable. The Restatement of Torts, in such cases, requires only foreseeable reliance and injury; "intent" that the injured
party rely is not necessary here, as it is in the financial loss situation. s
Furthermore, the tenor of recent opinions gives every indication that a
testing company will not evade liability easily with a specious privity
argument. As an abstract consideration, however, liability should require
parties are known to them personally and that they appeared and acknowledged the

instrument. See Annot., 34 A.L.R. 67, 74-76.
4. 10 M.&W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 [Ex. 1842].
5. 52 N.J.L. 240, 19 Atd. 472 (1890).
6. See also Dickerson v. Shephard Warner Elevator Co., 287 F.2d 255 (6th Cir.
1961) ; Dahms v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733, 7 P.2d 1013 (1932) ; Cowles v.
Independent Elevator Co., 22 Cal. App. 2d 100, 70 P.2d 711 (1937).

7. 52 N.J.L. at 247, 19 Atl. at 475.
8. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 311 (1934)
(1) One a part of whose business or profession it is to give information upon

which the bodily security of others depends and who in his business or professional

capacity gives false information to another is subject to liability for bodily harm
caused by the action taken in reliance upon such information by the recipient or
by a third person to whom the actor should expect the information to be com-

municated if the actor, although believing the information to be accurate, has
failed to exercise reasonable care
a) to ascertain its accuracy, or

b) in his choice of language in which it is given.
(2) The actor is subject to liability under the statement in Subsection (1)
not only to the recipient or to a third person who expectably acts in reliance
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no more in the financial loss situation than in the case of physical injury.
So long as all the elements - representation, reliance, foreseeability and
injury - are present, liability should accrue in either case. Practically,
however, it seems unlikely that courts will repair an injured pocketbook
as readily as they will compensate for physical injury.9
III.
THE PRIVITY DOCTRINE IN

NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION

In the early case of Derry v. Peek,' the court refused to apply the
concept of negligent misrepresentation to a financial loss situation. A
tramway company represented in its prospectus that it had the right to
use steam power in its operations. Only after the plaintiff had purchased
stock in reliance on this representation did the defendant company
apply for permission to use steam power. The application was rejected,
defendant went out of business and plaintiff sought damages resultant
from the misrepresentation. The court, speaking in terms of deceit, rejected plaintiffs contentions, stating that a misrepresentation must be
fraudulent and not merely negligent before such liability would be imposed. English, and also many American, courts have relied on this case
as precluding recovery for financial loss in such situations." The doctrine
was rejected, however, in some American jurisdictions. In the leading
United States case of Glanzer v. Shepherd,12 the seller hired the defendant,
a public weigher, to certify the weight of beans purchased by the plaintiff. The plaintiff prevailed in a suit against the weigher. The court
found a duty owing to the buyer even though no contractual relationship
existed. The defendant had certified 13 the weight and delivered a copy
upon it but also to such third person as the actor should expect to be put in peril
by the action taken.
This has been expanded in RESTATMFNT (StcoND), TORTS § 311 (1965) to include
all physical harm, not just bodily harm and it eliminates the necessity for business or
professional relation between the parties-it extends even to gratuitous representations:
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to

liability for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable
reliance upon such information, where such harm results
a) to the other, or
b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by
the action taken
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care,

a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
b) in the manner in which it is communicated.
9. See Note, 62 MicH. L. Rnv. 145, 149 (1963), which discusses among other
things the distinction between physical injury and financial loss:
Because personal injury and property damage are usually caused by physical
forces, there is often a rough correlation between the magnitude of the force
negligently released and the extent of the resulting injury. When words are the

cause of tortious injury there is frequently no such correlation.
10. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
11. This has been subsequently disapproved in the case of Hedley Byrne & Co. v.
Heller & Partners (H:L. 1963) ; See, 77 HARV. L. Rev. 773 (1964).
12. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
13. See Note, 36 NOmRE DAM LAW. 176, 182 (1961), where it is said that the
court in International Products Co. v. Erie R.R. Co., 244 N.Y. 231, 155 N.E. 662
(1927)
interpreted Glanzer to have held not that there had been any negligence in the
act of weighing but that the negligent act was the issuance of the false certificate,
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of the certification to the plaintiff, in accordance with the sellers instructions. "The defendants held themselves out to the public as skilled
and careful in their calling. They knew that the beans had been sold;
14
and that on the faith of their certificate payment would be made.'
The rule to be adduced from the opinion is that if one assumes an
obligation he may owe a duty of care; if a duty is found, he may
be liable even in the absence of privity and liability will be dependent
upon the character of the reliance and the "proximity . . . in the thought

or purpose of the actor"' 5 of the harm caused by such reliance.
However, in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,16 a subsequent New York
case, the court refused to extend recovery in negligent misrepresentation
to third parties who relied on an accountant's certificate in negotiating
a loan to the certified company. Recovery was denied since the plaintiff
was among an "indeterminate class of persons who, presently or in the
future, might deal with the Sterm Company in reliance on the audit."' 7
The certification in Glanzer was primarily for the benefit of the plaintiff,
while in Ultramares it was primarily for the company whose balance
sheet was certified.
The important distinction between these cases seems to be the extent
of possible liability. Traditional foreseeability is not the problem, since
the accountant could reasonably foresee any number of uses of the certified balance sheet in Ultrainares especially use for credit purposes. But
since these foreseeable uses would create risks' 8 of myriad and burden20
some liabilities19 the court refused further extension of the rule.
an act which the International court clearly did not think distinguishable from
the act of orally giving a false representation as to the location of goods.
14. 233 N.Y. at 239, 135 N.E. at 276; it is also stated in the opinion that,
One who follows a common calling may come under a duty to another whom he
serves, though a third may give the order or make the payment.
and,
It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may
thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all
Id. at 241, 135 N.E. at 277; the court suggests that other routes less direct than
"duty" could be followed, e.g., under the doctrine of third party beneficiaries.
15. Id. at 240, 135 N.E. at 276.
16. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
17. Id. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446.
18. Id. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448, an indication of this is the court's statement that:
• .. public accountants are public only in the sense that their services are offered
to any one who chooses to employ them. This is far from saying that those who
do not employ them are in the same position as those that do.
19. But see, Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20, aff'd without
opinion, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829, 285 App. Div. 864 (1954), where an accountant was held
liable to a third party, not in fraud, but in gross negligence. Of course, the facts
are not analogous to Ultramares; in Duro the plaintiff was one of two stockholders
of the corporation, which hired the defendant to do the audit. He later relied
thereon to his disadvantage in negotiating to buy out the other stockholder. See,
Hawkins, A Symposium On Professional Negligence: Professional Negligence
Liability Of Public Accountants, 12 VANy. L. Riv. 797, 817 (1959), which criticizes
the gross negligence basis and says that Ultramares is based on scope of liability not
on the degree of fault, and that scope of liability should be the determining factor.
"[T]he problem is not solved by floundering about in the distinction between negligence
and gross negligence."
20. See Note, 62 Micn. L. Riv. 145 (1963), which discusses Ultramares. The
author agrees with the court that disproportionate liability in accountant cases should
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IV.
MODERN NOTIONS OF EXPANDED LIABILITY IN
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION

With rare exception in particular cases, 21 the distinction between
Glanzer and Ultramares has been retained in those jurisdictions which
have allowed an action in negligent misrepresentation. Courts have not
escaped their fear of extensive liability. Only in recent years has any
break in this tendency appeared. However, the American Law Institute
has been on record for years in Section 552 of the Restatement of
Torts 22 expressing its opinion on expanded liability for negligent misrepresentation.28 Its position can be interpreted as concurring in the Ultranares
view of liability, 24 as seen in comment (a) to that section, where it is
said that:
It is not enough to subject the person supplying the information
to liability that he, as a reasonable man, should realize the probability
that the information will be communicated to persons for whose
guidance he does not supply it or that it will be relied upon in
transactions other than those
25 in which it is intended to influence
the conduct of the recipient.
Some would propose that the accountant's certificate is meant only for
the certified company's purposes, or for a particular named purpose
(for example, a specific loan). But such an assertion ignores reality.
Surely it is not solely a check on its internal accounting procedure;
rather, it is desired for any number of other reasons including use in bank
credit, and by purchasers, sellers and stockholders. Unless certified for
relieve from liability, but doesn't think the, privity rule, as such, is good. He believes
that the extent of liability should be the criterion.
21. See, note 3 supra.
22. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 552 (1938) provides:
One who in the course of his business or profession supplies information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions is subject to liability for harm
caused to them by their reliance upon the information if
a) he fails to exercise that care and competence in obtaining and communicating
the information which its recipient is justified in expecting, and
b) the harm is suffered
(i) by the person or one of the class of persons for whose guidance the information was supplied, and
(ii) because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a transaction in which it was
intended to influence his conduct or in a transaction substantially identical
therewith.
23. See also, PROSSPR, TORTS, 168 (2d ed. 1955):
No better general statement can be made than that the courts will find a duty
where, in general, reasonable men would recognize it and agree that it exists.
24. Hawkins, supra note 19, at 818-19.
25. See also, RISTATFMSNT, TORTS, § 552, comment (h) (1938).
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a particular named purpose, such as a line of credit, an ordinary certification comes within the rule expressed by comment (g) to Section 552,
where it is stated that third parties who reasonably rely on the certificate
can be considered persons "for whose guidance it is supplied," since the
20
supplier of information need not "have any particular person in mind,"
so long as, "the information is supplied for repetition to a particular
class of persons and that the person relying on it is one of that class."
"[T]he nature and extent of the transaction in which it is to be used"
are the essential limiting factors. Such limitation clearly does not exclude
normal use of a certified balance sheet.
However, even if recovery would be denied in the Ultramaressituation
under section 552, it would seem that liability could still be imposed
in the testing area. The representation, although distributed to a vast
number of people, is designed to induce reliance by those to whom it is
communicated and if they rely to their detriment, liability should ensue.
A few jurisdictions have imposed liability for negligent misrepresentation in fact situations that go beyond Glanzer. Such expansion is
evoked by the influence of the Restatement of Torts 27 and a generally
more liberal judicial attitude. In these more progressive jurisdictions, if
the certification or representation has been made negligently, and one for
whom the information is supplied relies on it to his detriment, recovery
will be allowed even though no privity exists.
The case of Biakanja v. Irving28 has caused the greatest amount of
speculation. Disapproving contrary precedent, 29 the California court
held a non-lawyer notary public liable in negligence for drafting decedent's will without the requisite attestation. Under the will, plaintiff
would have received the entire estate; however, because of the notary's
negligence, he received only a one-eighth share upon intestacy. The
court granted recovery to the plaintiff, in the absence of privity, through
a balancing of a number of factors ...
• * . among which are the extent to which the transaction was
intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him,
the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness
of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to 0the defendant's conduct, and
the policy of preventing future harm.3
26. IRSTAThFgNT, ToRTs, § 552, comment (g) (1938). In that comment it is
stated that as to those persons to whom the negligent supplier of misinformation may
be liable, he "is subject to the same restriction as that of the maker of a fraudulent
misrepresentation." The Ultramares opinion would not go so far. In that case the
court refused to expand liability so as to be "coterminous with that of liability for
fraud."
27. E.g., Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
28. Ibid.
29. Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895) ; Michel v. Murphy, 147
Cal. App. 2d 718, 305 P.2d 993 (1957).
30. 49 Cal. 2d at 653, 320 P.2d at 19.
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Applying this test to other fact situations, it appears the result may
not favor recovery in Ultramares. An accountant who negligently certifies an incorrect balance sheet might avoid liability as the court itself
suggests in saying that such is a "collateral consideration of the transaction."' 31 However, in testing company situations the transaction is
certainly intended to affect the plaintiffs; the sole reason for making
such a representation is to induce reliance and thereby facilitate sales of
products and services. Though certainty of injury will be a matter of
proof, the harm is readily foreseeable. Moreover, the reliance evoked
seems to create a sufficiently close connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered. And considerations of moral blame
and prevention of future harm are certainly weighted in favor of the
injured party. The only factor not articulated in Biakanja and one which
admittedly could be controlling is the scope of liability. Would that
court impose liability where the incurrence of injury could be multiple
and the resulting cost tremendous ?32
In another California case, which relies on Biakanja, M. Miller Co.
v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist.,3 3 the court imposed liability on

soil engineers who negligently performed their work to the detriment of
the plaintiffs. Their soil testing report failed to show unstable peat
material in the soil which greatly increased the cost of installing a sewer
line. The court imposed liability in the absence of privity because (1)
the transaction between defendant and the sanitary district was intended
to affect plaintiff (as one of the bidders for whom the soil test was made),
(2) the harm was foreseeable, and (3) plaintiff's injury resulted directly
from defendant's negligence. The case seems to extend Biakanja because
in Miller the third party could have been any one of a number of
unknown bidders, whereas in Biakanja the plaintiff was a single-named
party in the will.
In a very similar situation, the sixth circuit refused to impose
liability on an engineering firm for a negligent omission from a boringlog drawing. 34 Several factors might serve to distinguish the latter case.
A disclaimer was submitted with the drawing, although admittedly such
disclaimers are generally ignored in the trade; the plaintiff was a subcontractor, thus one step further removed than in Miller; and the
information could have been acquired by the plaintiff if he had merely
asked. Though none of these facts, in itself, seems sufficient to change
the problem, their concurrence in one case understandably caused the
court to term this case an improper one for expansion.
31. Ibid.
32. Other California cases have cited Biakanja for authority including, Lucas v.
Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685 (1961), which agreed with Biakanja in principle
but denied recovery because the attorney made a mistake of law in a complex area.
(Rule Against Perpetuities and restraint against alienation). An attorney will not be
held liable for every mistake. Also, De Zemplen v. Federal Say. and Loan Ass'n,
34 Cal. App. 334 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
33. 198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1962).
34. Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964).
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With only sporadic instances of judicial expansion of liability in
negligent misrepresentation, it would be unfair to say that a real trend
is evidenced (with the possible exception of manufacturer's liability to
ultimate consumers).35 The great weight of authority remains to the
contrary. The leading case against such liability is National Iron & Steel
Co. v. Hunt.30 The defendant was hired by the seller to inspect rails
which the Foster Company purchased subject to the condition of such
inspection. The defendant's certificate was transferred with the rails to
the plaintiff upon resale by the Foster Company. When the rails failed
to conform to the certification, the plaintiff sued the inspection company
in negligence. At trial, the judgment for the plaintiff was based on
reliance upon the certificate of experts, generally recognized as fixing
the character and value of the materials. The defendants had assumed
a duty (inspection) which regulated plaintiff's conduct (purchase). The
decision was reversed in the state supreme court. The court determined
that, absent privity, no duty existed, thus rendering negligence and
reliance immaterial. Distinguishing Glanzer, the court observed that here
the defendant did not deliver the certificate of inspection to the plaintiff,
nor was the defendant advised by the plaintiff that it was going to rely
upon defendant's inspection. The distinguishing factors are makeweights,
at best, since delivery of the certificates to the plaintiff was apparently
made with the defendant's knowledge. Under such circumstances the
plaintiff would naturally rely on the certificate even though the defendant
was not so informed. Many courts continue to use these and other factors
to restrict imposition of liability.
3
An example of such other criteria can be found in Howell v. Betts, T

where the court, conceding that liability in negligence without privity
is actionable, denied that an error made by a surveyor in 1934 could be
asserted twenty-four years later. Thus, time serves to limit the scope
38
of the certifier's duty.
The Biakanja rule of California has been expressly rejected by the
Supreme Court in New York in the case of Maneri v. Amodeo.3 9 There,
a lawyer who negligently failed to include a residuary clause in a will, as
directed by decedent, was not liable to those harmed. New York holds
a lawyer liable to a third party only for fraud, collusion or malicious
or tortious act. Although this lower court opinion might not withstand
appellate court scrutiny, nevertheless, it shows a more conservative attitude
in New York not consonant with extension of liability.
Although little authority in negligent misrepresentation can be gathered
to support liability of testing companies to purchasers and consumers at
35. There are specific exceptions; e.g., for notary publics. See cases cited note 3
supra.
36. 192 Ill. App. 215 (1915), rev'd 312 Ill. 245, 143 N.E. 833 (1924).
37. 211 Tenn. 134, 362 S.W.2d 924 (1962).
38. See also, Hawkins v. Oakland Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 331 P.2d 742 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
39. 38 Misc. 2d 190, 238 N.Y.S.2d 302 (S.Ct. 1963).
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large, reason, at least, seems to support such liability. No case has
gone far enough to impose such liability but all the elements elicited
in the Biakanja case, excluding the unenunciated scope of liability factor,
seem to be met. But should "extent of liability" free the tester from
liability altogether? Since his certificate of quality is intended to reach
those who rely why should the courts remove all obligation in every
instance? Why should his burden be less than that of a manufacturer
who ordinarily would be liable? Though such liability could ruin a
manufacturer if imposed without limits, the judge-made "floodgates"
of proximate cause can be closed to prevent such ruin. Why overlook an
analagous limitation on the extent (not the existence) of the certifier's
liability. If the certifier's error causes extensive harm, why should those
harmed be held to bear the brunt of the injury?
A few homely examples point up the specious nature of the foreseeability argument. Consider a bodily injury case where a testing
company certifies the quality of a certain toothpaste and ten thousand
persons' teeth dissolve because the toothpaste is really an acid; certainly
the tester can foresee that such a blunder will cause widespread injury.
Or in a financial loss case where the tester certifies seed as 99.7%
pure, when its actual content is 60.0% weed seed, ruined crops as a
result of such an error are obviously foreseeable. In less severe situations,
the foreseeability doctrine could properly serve to withhold liability.
Even the scope of liability, argument lacks conviction since the
certification is meant to guide the whole menage of purchasers who do
rely. Moreover, Ultramares is not authority to the contrary; that case
can be distinguished because there "the service was primarily for the
benefit of the Stern Company,

. .

. and only incidentally or collaterally for

the use of" third parties. But here the service, as in Glanzer on a smaller
scale, is for those third parties who do in fact rely thereon.
Understandably, courts would approach imposition of such widescale liability with trepidation. And in fact, judicial approval will
probably not come, at least in any significant amount, without prior
legislative approval.

V.
MODERN NOTIONS OF LIABILITY IN

EXPRESS WARRANTY

Another possible basis for imposing liability on testing companies,
that of express warranty, presents even more difficult problems. Though
the privity relationship which was traditionally essential for maintaining a warranty action40 has been emasculated by time, the economic
position of the testing company would pose a serious problem in such
40. This also evolved from Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep.
402 [Ex. 1842].

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965

9

SUMMER 1965]

Villanova LawCOMMENTS
Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 4 [1965], Art. 12

an action. Perhaps comparison of the status of the manufacturer with
that of the testing company will elucidate the problem.
The manufacturer provides products to consumers through a direct
flow of commerce. Though middle-men intervene, other factors, such
as brand names, 41 and mass advertising programs 4 2 serve to link producer
to ultimate consumer. This link confers standing upon the consumer
to maintain the suit. If a breach of warranty exists, no fault on the
manufacturer's part need be shown. Yet, such harm does result from a
failure of sorts, though not a "legal fault" by the manufacturer. This
failure, whether in the materials used or the mode of manufacture provides, at least, some basis for the imposition of absolute liability.
The certifier's economic position is vastly different. He is a party
collateral to the flow of commerce and in no way involved in the process
of manufacture. Though he undertakes the role of representing quality,
not even non-legal fault can be attributed to him unless some negligence
on his part can be shown. 43 The exception to this rule would arise when
the defect in the product is so patent as to render any certification clearly
erroneous.4 4 Though a recent trend appears, extending warranty protection to parties outside the distributive chain in certain situations, 5
vastly different considerations are involved in expanding warranty
liability to include collateral parties.
Thus, though good reason may exist to burden the testing company
with liability in negligent misrepresentation, it is submitted that liability
in warranty could be justified only in a most severe situation.
VI.
SPECIAL

CIRCUMSTANCES

Whether the action sounds in negligent misrepresentation or in
warranty, can the certifier escape liability on the grounds that the
representation was gratuitiously made? In fact, certification without
compensation probably never occurs and, even if it did, such altruism
would invariably be coupled with judgment-proof finances. But assume
that as a special service the certifier represents the quality of a product,
or, more realistically, that it sells the service directly to the public in
the form of a magazine which evaluates the products of various manu41. Cf. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 226

N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).

42. Cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), aff'd 179 Wash. 123,
35 P.2d 1090 (1934).
43. This appears a dominant factor underlying the decision inthe one testing company case sounding in warranty, Albin v. Illinois Crop Improvement Ass'n, Inc.,
30 Ill.
App. 2d 283, 174 N.E.2d 697 (1961).
44. When the product is of very high quality, but one unit is seriously defective Query ?
45. Cf. UNIiORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-318 (1962); and see generally Note,
10 VILL. L. Rav. 607 (1965).
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facturers. If the harmed consumer purchased the publication, substantial
basis for imposing liability would exist since this would establish at least
a semblance of privity between the certifier and the injured party. The
more difficult situation would arise when the consumer purchased goods
in reliance on the representation, but had not purchased the magazine.
The certifier's contention that the service was intended only for those
who purchased it would be countered with the argument that its representations were designed for widespread general publication. Whether
the absence of compensation between the manufacturer and the certifier
would provide a channel for evading liability is conjectural at best.
An additional factor must be considered - will the testing service
ever certify quality? If, instead, it only provides its "opinion" no action
will lie.46 Again, of course, except for the case where a true certification
is made and sold as a service to a purchaser in a privity relationship,
there is little hope for judicial recognition of liability.
Disclaimers will present further problems. If in proper form they
probably will excuse liability in warranty.47 However, negligent misrepresentation is a distinct problem - can you free yourself from liability in
negligence by merely renouncing any responsibility in advance? Perhaps
so, because the plaintiff will thereby be on notice that he should not rely
on the representation. At any rate, the problem will not materialize
unless and until liability is accepted in this area.
VII.
UNFAIR COMPETITION -

LIABILITY TO COMPETITORS

What about competitors who lose business as a result of false representations that increase the sales of the misrepresented products? It
appears established under current common law that no action in their
favor exists even against a manufacturer who misrepresents his product
much less against a testing company once removed from the manufacturer. The leading case is American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw
Manufacturing Co. 48 Although the plaintiff had a monopoly over such
aluminum products neither an action for damages nor for an injunction
was allowed against a competitor who falsely represented his washboards
as aluminum. No violation of property rights will be recognized unless
"passing off" occurs (in one way or another passing your product off
as that of the plaintiff). Judicial approval of an action for damages
appears highly unlikely because of the difficult task of proving the amount
of damages.
46. Opinion is distinguished from the statement of a fact in: Wedding v. Duncan,
310 Ky. 374, 220 S.W.2d 564 (1949); Warren v. Walter Automobile Co., 99 N.Y.S.
396, 50 Misc. 605 (App. T., 1906) ; Oneal v. Weisman, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 592, 88
S.W. 290 (1905).
47. But see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
48. 103 Fed. 281 (6th Cir. 1900).
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However, a possibility for recovery exists under relevant federal
legislation,49 which provides that, in reference to goods sold in interstate
commerce,
any person who shall affix, apply, or annex
any false description
or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to
describe or represent the same . . .shall be liable to a civil action ...
by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the
use of any such false description or representation.
Two obstacles of statutory interpretation must be overcome before
liability could be imposed on a testing company under this statute. First,
does the statute refer exclusively to a defendant manufacturer or could
"any person" extend to testing companies? Since used without qualification, the term would appear to be designed for broad interpretation,
thus including a testing company. Such an interpretation becomes more
palatable in light of the privity relation that exists between the testing
company and the manufacturer that employed it.
The other problem concerns itself with whether the statute refers
to false representations which are not "passing off." The issue remains
unsettled, with authority existing on both sides of the question. Gold
Seal Co. v. Weeks 50 interprets the section broadly:
In this respect Section 43(a) does create a federal statutory tort,
sui generis, and to this extent Johnson [the plaintiff] need not show
that any false description or representation was willful or intentional,
need not prove actual diversion of trade (palming off, so to speak),
need not establish a veritable monopoly position in the industry.
It means that wrongful diversion of trade resulting from false
description of one's products invades that interest which an honest
competitor has in fair business dealings. .... 51
However, the court neither held the defendant manufacturer liable in
damages nor enjoined further like advertising because plaintiff failed to
52
prove its claim.
Other cases have indicated that courts believe the statute should
be limited to "passing off" or be "of the same general character even
49. 15 U.S.C. 1125 (1946) (Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act).
50. 129 F. Supp. 928 (D. D.C. 1955), aff'd. sub nom. S.C. Johnson & Son v. Gold
Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
51. 129 F. Supp. at 940.
52. Ibid.
It has not shown damage or likelihood of damage due to the fact that any substantial number of reasonable customers were misled or likely to be misled as

to the nature of the product, they having understood the mark to designate the
ingredients, buying the product for its wax content rather than for its effectiveness as a cleaner; or that if they had known the true facts, they most likely

would have purchased a different product, whether that of Johnson or some other
competitor. The evidence fails to show that Gold Seal Glass Wax is inferior
to any similar product marketed by a competitor, or that it has rested or needs
to rest upon the borrowed good will of the wax industry generally to maintain
commercial success.
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though they do not involve any use of what technically can be called
a trade.mark. ''5 3 How liberally the statute will be construed is conjectural at present, and in any case the problem of proving damages will
remain difficult. Nevertheless, it does provide at least some chance of
expanded liability.
VIII.
CONCLUSION

In these days of enlightened principles of social justice, long-standing
legal rules of artifically reasoned immunity lose much of their previous
efficacy. A remedy, albeit a legislative one, should be fashioned to
protect the interests of innocent parties injured by reliance on the representations of those who make it their business to produce such representations.
Christopher J. Clark
53. Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963);
Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat. Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D. Mass. 1949),
aff'd per curiam 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950).
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